The Korean War: Tactics and Logistics

The Second field cont destroy officially ended in the year 1945. It was a devastating war that many hoped that it should be fitting to end all wars and for a change give the world a animate space, to be granted that actually elusive peace. Yet, perhaps those who wished for a world in harmony after World state of war II may deplete underestimated mankinds appetite of some leaders who wanted to be supreme rulers of the globe.So, five years after the guns were silenced in the Great orbit of war in Europe, another dangerous conflict is bre break throughg in Korea. Here, superstar can see a display of liaisons to come be start out Vietnam and Afghanistan argon bargeen future events.In the Korean contend the world became witness to what happens when superpowers decide to play chess. Unfortunately, this game is not vie the traditional way with wooden pieces and all.This succession the chessboard is the Korean Peninsula and the pieces are either the native Koreans or imported a s in soldiers coming in from all over the world. It is interesting to note that this is not a World War in the truest sense of the term, however the true players are global leaders who happened to confine their violent resolution in a specific location, Korea. The United States, Russia, sum and southeastern Korea, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and other Asian nations were participants in this war of attrition. The battle lines were drawn and it was named the 38th parallel. This allowed for a brusque bearing in a very confusing succession, hoping to give a little bit of clarity in a very agitating situation. tally to Carter Malkasian, It was the only when occasion in the Cold War when the legions forces of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union, and the USA (plus its Western allies) met in fight Thus, the Korean War was not merely a war fought between proxies of the major powers, analogous the latter conflicts in Vietnam or Afghanistan, but a to a great er extent than more significant conflagration (p. 7).This paper seeks to understand the Korean War. This can be d whiz by looking at a brief historic background before the war and the events that added fuel to the tension between two Korean governwork forcets. Since the Korean War like many conflicts is so complicated this remove focuses on tactics and logistics, and less on the historical figures that played a major role in this important period not only for Koreans but for Asians in particular and the world in general.Historical BackgroundThe Korean War was sometimes called the Forgotten War and this may be so because like Vietnam there are only a few sight who understand its significance. Yet an outpouring of books, articles and film in the last decade as salutary as an impressive memorial on Washington, DCs Mal (and the realization that) it would be practically im realistic to understand the Cold War have created a revival of interest on this subject (Sandler, p.1).The confli ct in this area of the world does not surprise the experts and the grizzled veterans of war. In fact the professional soldier can advantageously read the undercurrent of history and be able to predict what go out happen in the struggle for power and supremacy. This was eerily demo by a seemingly prophetic Commodore Matthew Perry when he spoke these words in the year 1856, a century before the Korean WarThe wad of America will, in some form or other, extend their dominion and their power upon the eastern shores of Asia. And I think too, that eastward and southward will her large(p) Russian rival The antagonistic exponents of freedom and absolutism must thus meet at last, and then will be fought that mighty battle on which the world will look with breathless interest for on its issue will depend the freedom or the slavery of the world (as cited in Huston, p. 200).It boggles the straits of the average person when analyzing as to how Commodore Perry was able to ascertain his cla ims. What is more amazing is the accuracy of his predictions. It is like looking in a crystal ball and comprehend very fall outly what will happen. And indeed what Perry prophesied came to pass. Russia became a superpower and however like what the Commodore had said, the Russian government exerted tremendous influence over China.And of course his final exam statement about the necessity of a crucial war that will showcase the fight for freedom as opposed to absolutism was alike played out just as he predicted. This can only mean that even before the first bullet crossed the 38th parallel, there are al flying forces at work even as far back as the late 19th century. Perry was able to read the signs and the saw the root cause of conflicts in this part of Asia. Yet it was only in the mid-fifties when the seed planted by those who wanted to control this region grew and blossomed into a passion that could only be satisfied with conquest.BlindsidedCommodore Perry was praised here beca use of his foresight, a very important talent that a general should possess. If only the leaders of the free world in the 1950s were as gifted, then things would have turned out differently. further as fate would have it, from the U.S. and UN side was able anticipate what is going to happen. Either they were blindsided by the Communists or they were preoccupied by their paranoia. And that paranoia is brought about by the fear of being overrun by a westward move by the Union Soviet Socialist Republic. Stanley Sandler remarked on this and he wroteA Soviet thrust into Western Europe seemed a far more threatening contingency than a possible dust-up between two unattractive regimes in a bleak former Japanese colony that more or less Americans could not find on a map. But Americans would become acquainted with Korea in a war that would turn out be the third bloodiest in their history and which for Koreans themselves would prove the greatest catastrophe in their national history (p. 2) .First BloodIt depends which side is asked. For the U.S. and UN Command, it was the North Koreans who drew first blood and labializeed without warning nor any form of declaration of war. It seems that history is tell itself once again for Americans just like in Pearl Harbor. But according to the communist- plunk for regime they were just retaliating from what the South has been doing for the past several months. The truth of the theme is that both sides were engaged in skirmishes that were serious advance to war.Sandler asserts that it was an, armed conflict between the Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea and the Republic of South Korea, which had been conducting mutual marge raids for more than a year (p. 2).At any rate the U.S. led forces were caught by surprise that fateful day of June 25, 1950. Even if they will deny it, it is now clear that the North were prepared to launch an attack and the offensive move was purely intentional.BuildupKim Il Sung the de facto lead er of the newly ceremonious North Korean Regime began to make plans to invade South Korea. This plan was of course made in secret but nevertheless in conterminous coordination with Russias Stalin and Chinas Mao Tse-tung. According to Allan Millett the origin of this plan can be traced back to a change in the policy of Kim Il Sungs benefactor to communize the whole Korean Peninsula (p. 102). It seems that Russia is no longer contented with being kept in check by a ridiculous 38th parallel and would like very much to gobble the whole Korean Peninsula. The Soviets, however, came to realize that the goal of communizing the entire peninsula could not be achieved through such limited tactics, and decided to resort to more violent means (Millet, p. 102).In December of 1948 the Soviets made the first tactical move to befuddle the U.S. by withdrawing their troops unilaterally out of North Korea. Then the Russian government turned around and invited the top brass of North Korea and Chinas military for a buildup. Millet bared that the troika agreed to build up the strength of the North Korea Peoples the States (NKPA), around 6 shock divisions, 8 combat and 8 reserve divisions, and 2 armored divisions and to complete the war preparations within 18 months (i.e., by June 1950) (p. 103). The NKPA was able to do all of these like clockwork divine revelation a tremendous level of preparedness and dangerous intent.Level of PreparednessWhile the NKPA was psychologically and physically prepared to engage in battle the ROK (Republic of Korea) force though prepared for future skirmishes and for another round of border raids was not truly ready for a full scale war. The South was not ready to face an enemy dead set in gobbling them up and desiring to unite the whole peninsula once again.It took at least five days after the initial offensive of NKPA for the U.S. to make a coherent response. On June 30, US President Harry S. Truman authorized US ground forces to stop the North Ko rean attack (Boose, p. 4). This led to losses in the early rounds of the fighting and led Boose to comment, It was able to do little to delay the KPA, but additional forces were on the way (p. 4). diversion from differing interests and the reasonably defective intelligence from the Western nations or they would have known of an imminent attack there is the psychological reason for being unprepared. Sandler made a comment why it was unlikely for the Korean Peninsula to be plunged into such a bloody conflict. And he wroteIn looking back (before World War II) it would be difficult to imagine a more homogeneous and united nation than Korea. they are of the same culture with minor north-south variations throughout the peninsula, and the Korean language Hangul is universal. Korean cultural homogeneity can be illustrated in its place name, a source of confusion for non-Korean UN personnel throughout the war Inchon/Ichon, Masan/Musan, Paengnyong/Pyongyan/Pyonggang Pyongchang, Taejon/T aechon, Pukchong/Pukchang(p. 3).That and the eight-spoteen month level start is creating a great advantage for the NKPA. In the end this advantage would create a stalemate and would result in the present division of Korea and the unlooked-for survival of this communist state even though its patron the great USSR had long been dismantled.NKPA PreparednessThe North Korean and the communist forces were not only important and aggressive they were able to create a force enough to challenge U.S. and UN supremacy in the South. The book, Communist Logistics in the Korean War by Charles Shrader is an comminuted source in getting an in-depth look at what happened on the other side. Too many times the victors or the presumed victors in the case of the Korean War are all too willing to gloss over their mistakes and hype their successes. The focal point of this book is the refutation of the myths perpetuated by the Americans and UN forces that were then passed on to people back home and unf ortunately was taken in as gospel truth. Shrader asserts and this is quite a revelation unmatched of the more persistent myths of the Korean War is that North Korean and Chinese communist solders were able to subsist on a mere handful of rice per day obtained all their arms and ammunition from their enemies, and moved all supplies by animal cart or human porters. Although supply requirements of NKPA and CCF in Korea were amazingly low when compared to the requirements for equivalent UNC units, the Communist forces did generate unattackable requirements for formal supply and transport forward of tremendous quantities of food, petroleum products, weapons, and ammunition (p. 89).The U.S. and UN led coalition were more technically advanced but this is not the most important thing in any given war. It is the level of preparedness that is important. That level of preparedness can only be gauged in relation to the milieu where a battle will be waged. Lets say for example that forces are slugging it out in a heavy-forested area with a very steep incline. No matter how sophisticated the military jeeps are, this kind of technology will be rendered effective.In another example where the passageway in a body of water is narrow and shallow no matter how technologically advanced the frigates are it would be foolish to attack using this route since one sunken vessel can immobilize the whole fleet. In other words tactics and logistics are the most important aspects to consider and not just technology. This is the bone of contention in Shraders books the South Korean forces was wrong in thinking that they were technically superior. This led Shrader to remark thatNKPA-CCF logistical doctrines and methods were characterized by flexibleness and innovation, which allowed them to compensate for comparative lack of material resources and modern technology NKPA and CCF logistical organizations were equally flexible and often exhibited great variation in form, strength, and equipm ent of the assigned improvement units (p. 25).What contributed well to the high level of preparedness by the NKPA aside from the Soviet support of course is the broad range of natural resources present in North Korea. This includes water, power, timber, rare strategic materials e.g. tungsten, zinc, graphite reserves, substantial iron ore deposits, copper, lead, cobalt, asbestos, molybdenum, nickel, gold and silver (Shrader, p. 60). This resulted to an almost miraculous surge in North Koreas war time production of needed materiel that surpassed pre-1945 levels 1) 166,000 tons of pig iron 2) 144,000 tons of steel ingot and 3) 116,000 tons of finished steel (Shrader, p. 61).Summing it all up the major source of military materiel came via USSR which supplied the NKPA with aircraft, tanks, vehicles, communications equipment, heavy artillery, and ammunition. In addition to that, a portion of their needs were supplied by third country suppliers (Shrader, p. 60).Thus when the communist f orces launched the initial attack in June of 1950 their combined forces produced the following massive force in the eve of the attack135,000 men in two corps comprising eight full-strength infantry divisions, two half-strength infantry divisions, an armored brigade, an independent infantry regiment, a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, and five brigades of the Bo An Dae, or Border Constabulary (Shrader, p. 90).What is more amazing is the development of the NKPA forces after the 1950s. After suffering setbacks from the retaliatory attacks of the UN command, the NKPA in the middle of 1951 the rebuild NKPA included 213,600 men in twenty-three infantry divisions, one mechanized division, one armored division, and two independent infantry brigades controlled by seven corps headquarters. NKPA strength peaked in October 1952 at around 266,000 men in eighteen divisions and six independent brigades (Shrader, p. 90).If this was not enough to give the South Koreans and its allies a full plate , the Chinese and the Soviets entered the fray in the pretext of helping a beleaguered brother-in-arms. The forces supplied by the Peoples Republic of China was more than enough to bring this regional level conflict into World War scale. The following data proves the serious intent of the communist blocBy late November 1950 some 300,000 Chines Communist troops were in Korea 180,000 in the six armies (eighteen divisions) of the XIIIth Army Group 120,000 in the three armies (twelve divisions) of the IXth Army Group on 1 July 1952, fify-one CCF divisions with some 540, 200 men manned the line across Korea from the west sailplaning to the central Taebaek Range and were supported by about 10,000 Soviet and Soviet-bloc advisors and technicians (Shrader, p.90).This is the extent of the level of North Koreas preparedness and a sample of their resolve to win this war.ROK PreparednessStanley Sandler in a few words was able to encapsulate the true state of South Koreas forces before the at tack by aspect that June 25, 1950 was a Sunday and that fully one-half of the ROK Army was on leave (p. 48).In the initial stage of the attack which was not at all done quietly and with any subtlety heavy bombardment, followed by a blitzkrieg attack of some 150 Soviet-built T-34-85, 110 warplanes and a crossing of the 38th couple by a rampaging Korean Peoples Army.Still there was an awfully delayed re process to the events at hand. Sandler explained the reason for such a tripping response due to the aforementioned soldiers who were on leave, the high number of civil leaders who were out of the country and the mistaken notion that what just occurred was another border raid.With regards to the presence of U.S. troops, Gordon Rottman lamented that fact that it was such in great shape a mere five years before the conflict and would have come skilful in a time like this. But Rottman revealed that the U.S. government intentionally reduced its military strength not only in Korea but a lso in the Far East. Rottman comments on the closest source for help which are the forces stationed in Japan and he wroteTank companies stationed in Japan had only M24 light tanks as Japanese roads and bridges could not support heavier M4A3 and M26 tanks. M24s were no match for North Korean T-34s, one of the best tanks to appear in World War II. The divisions in Japan also lacked their reconnaissance, military police, and replacement companies These divisions consisted of 12,500 to 13,600 troops rather than the full-strength 18,804 (p. 3).At first glance, South Korea does not stand a chance against the forces of Communism.Ironically, the same benefactor who gave NKPA a tactical and logistical advantage (USSR) became the source of their demise. Sensing that the North/South conflict is just a prelim for something bigger Russias enemies were banded together for a common cause, which is to prevent the USSR and Communism from expanding worldwide. This resulted in a pl beach of commitme nt to provide support in a scale reminiscent of Word War II. When the NKPA was not able to achieve total victory, this gave the U.S. and UN led coalition to regroup and pose a in good order defense of South Korea.Rottman expounded on this idea by saying thatThe Korean War was to be the UNs first commitment of armed forces to conduct and end a war the UN called on all member nations to support the military perspiration in Korea. Fifty-three countries approved of armed action against North Korea 15 committed ground combat forces, nine provided naval forces, six sent air force elements, and five contributed medical support, either military or civilian (p. 117).Bright SpotIn general there is nothing that U.S. armed forces could be proud of in the Korean War. There was really no clear victor, no territory was gained and as mentioned earlier it was the third bloodiest in the history of war where casualties are at a significant high.The only good thing that could be seen or learned from this incident is the demonstration of what bravery and commitment can do to an organization. Here one can also see the difference of opinion between a regular soldier in the U.S. Army as opposed to the brave and the few of the U.S. Marine Corp.Hugh Deane quoted Andrew Greer when describing the essence of being a marine, In any small unit battle the outstanding behavior of a few men is always discernible over the others The scale is tipped by a few by the ten percent who rise to the heights where the enemy and death can be met without a hesitant step (p. 97).British historian Max Hastings remarked, Most of the Eight Army fell apart as a fighting force in a spurt resembling the collapse of the French in 1940, the British in Singapore in 1942. But he reported the praiseworthy strong resistance of the U.S. Marines in the northeastern (as cited in Deane, p. 111).A particular example was raised by Deane when he commented on the enemys attack tactics that looked like suicide attempts characterized by sending small units that more often than not gets wiped out. This is followed by wave after wave of such small unit attacks against a selected point until a breakthrough is achieved and here comes the main force. This was effective in demoralizing troops. But according to Deane this would not work against the marines. but against the marines in the Northeast the results were often frustrating. The marines constructed potently fortified outposts in the hilly-forested Chosin area and defended them fiercely with a good deal of success (p. 129).ConclusionAlmost all wars are considered a waste of time, money, effort and lives of men. The Korean War was no exception. Considering the following statistics makes one shake hid head over the folly of warThe North Korean armed forces lost some 600,000 men in the fighting, in addition to two million civilian casualties. The Chinese an estimated 1 million casualties. Losses to the ROK are estimated at 70,000 killed, 150,000 w ounded and 80,000 captured. One million South Korean civilians were killed or injured. The USA lost 33,600 men kiled nad 103,200 wounded (Malkasian, p. 88).What adds insult to injury is the futility of not having a clear victor, no territories were gained and nothing significant was achieved except perhaps for a few lessons in the book of tactics. The level of preparedness of both camps explained the reason for the stalemate. The South Korea side was backed up by a technologically superior U.S. and UN led coalition but it was not mentally prepared to wage this war. Almost every action done on the part of South Korea was mostly reactionary and defensive. Most importantly, the United States was treading on thin ice since a miscalculation and overkill can easily escalate the regional conflict into a global war. With the Second World War fresh from peoples minds there is no incentive to go full force.Although the NKPA was well prepared and very much flexible in their serious bid to unit e the Korean Peninsula it does not have the technological edge to overpower the U.S. and UN forces. On a more important note, the attack on South Korea was a supposed to be a defensive act. Therefor the USSR could not be seen as fully involved and thus it can only work from the background.That sums up the futility of this exercise but nevertheless it is a good prelude to understand the Cold War and the other similar conflicts that came after it like Vietnam and Afghanistan.ReferencesDeane, H. (1999). The Korean War. San Francisco, CA China Books and Periodicals, Inc.Huston, J. A. (1988). Outposts and Allies U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War. sunrise(prenominal) JerseyAssociated University Press.Malkasian, C. (2001). The Korean War. University Park, IL. Osprey Publishing.Shrader, C. (1995). Communist Logistics in the Korean War. Westport, CT GreenwoodPress.Millet, A. R. (1997). The Korean War. Seoul Korea Institute of Military History.Sandler, S. (1999). The Korean War No Victors, No Vanquished. Kentucky University ofKentucky Press.Rottman, G. (2002). Korean War Order of Battle. Westport, CT Praeger Publishers.